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I
As a starting point, it may be said that criticism [of Keats's
Ode on a Grecian Urn], perhaps as a consequence of its own
historical needs as much as any imperatives towards ultimate
truths, seems to be moving to a position whereby the poem is
interpreted through the hypothesis of a 'speaker' or 'dramatic'
persona, who is held at a distance from the 'poet' whom we
conceive to be behind the whole artifact. ... this controlling
persona, whom we shall call the 'poet', can be seen to exercise
a parodic or ironic overview, placing in a critical light the
attempts of the speaker to cull meaning and moral guidance
from the silent object before him. As such, the poet would
seem to provide that level of heightened self-consciousness and
stable positioning which we now tend to call 'metalanguage' or
'metacommentary' .1
The critical distinction between two voices or consciousnesses
in Ode on a Grecian Urn that David Simpson here takes as 'a
starting point' for his discussion of the poem I want to adopt
as a starting point for my own. However historically
contingent or merely fashionable, the distinction itself is
surely a difficult one to deny. One might argue as Coleridge
does of Wordsworth's 'The Thorn' that, as a dramatic
monologue, the Ode is unevenly sustained, creating
occasional confusions2. Or as Simpson himself does that the
'speaker' and 'poet', commentator and metacommentator,
dissolve into a paradoxical synthesis at a crucial point. The
distinction may be said, technically, to obtain between two
2
56
David Simpson, Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry (London
and Basingstoke, 1979), p. 8.
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personae or to inhere within a single persona3; mayor may
not be seen to represent 'a dialogue of the mind with itself'4
and may even be interpreted as reflecting a contradiction at
the heart of early nineteenth-century petty bourgeois
ideology with regard to its yearning for cultural
appropriation5. But for the moment at least, the relative
validity of any or all of these readings is of less concern than
that the distinction they assume is there, in the poem itself.
The speaker, wilfully misreading or overreading the urn, says
too many things that are irrelevant or self-preoccupied or just
plain silly for him to be trusted as an authority. On the
contrary, what becomes apparent quite early is an authority
to distrust him - to distrust, say, the overly earnest attempts
to communicate with an inanimate object; the militant
idealism; the manic repetition of the word 'happy' in the
third stanza, this last at once discomfiting and yet
categorically different from earlier Keatsian embarrassments
like 'slippery blisses' and 'Pleasure's nipple' in Endymion.6
To the genuine authority, on the other hand - the
'heightened self-consciousness' and 'controlling persona'
carrying the responsibility for the whole poem - Simpson
gives the title of 'poet', though the title itself is 'strictly a
descriptive convenience'7 because the speaker, and only the
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and actor, distant observer and empathic participant .. .'; in his One
Foot in Eden: Modes of Pastoral in Romantic Poetry (Chapel Hill
and London, 1986), p. 230.
Matthew Arnold on the decadence of Romantic poetry in the Preface
to the Poems (1853); see Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold,
ed. A. Dwight Culler (Boston, 1961), pp. 203-214 (p. 203).
As Marjorie Levinson argues; see the Introduction to her Keats's Life
of Allegory: The Origins of a Style (Oxford, 1988), pp. 1-44.
Endymion, II, 758; 868. Though I choose the 'notorious' phrases
defended by Christopher Ricks in the fourth chapter of his Keats and
Embarrassment (Oxford, 1974), p. 104 and ff., the radical difference
in rhetorical function should excuse me from entering the lists.
Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry, p. 10.
57
SYDNEY STUDIES
speaker, actually characterizes himself as a poet. What we
have in Simpson's scheme, then, is a poet proper and a poet
improper, the poet proper 'controlling' the attempts of the
poet improper 'to cull meaning and moral guidance from
the silent object before him' while simultaneously 'placing
[them] in a critical light'.
Two things follow from the prevailing model of the poem
outlined by Simpson. The first is that what is at issue here has
as much to do with readers and critical reading as it has with
poets and poetry8, especially insofar as reading involves a
collaborative poesis, or making. And it is true that our
attention in the Ode is focussed neither on the poetry per se
nor on the aesthetic object (the urn), but on the prevailing
consciousness of the speaker/beholder and his responses to
and relations with that object. Moreover, insofar as critical
reading or the culling of 'meaning and moral guidance' also
invokes questions of human motive and of human 'being',
then the Ode is an essay on the process of apperception: that
perception or 'reading' of either nature or art 'which
reflects, as it were, upon itself' - to quote the eighteenth-
century philosopher Thomas Reid - 'by which we are
conscious of our own existence, and conscious of our own
perceptions'9.
The second thing that follows is that the speaker is a 'straw
poet' only, a fiction to enable the poet proper to 'exercise a
parodic or ironic overview' and enforce his 'heightened'
vision. Were it a 'dialogue', it would be Socratic, allowing as
it does the poet improper only such rope as he needs to hang
himself. But it is in fact no dialogue at all. Not only is the
poet proper wiser, he is also ontologically prior and superior;
8
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as creator and controller, he is more 'real' than his improper
counterpart.
Yet for all that superiority, as a 'persona', the poet proper
is no less a fiction. Certainly neither poet in Simpson's
account is the poet, John Keats, reference (let alone
deference) to whom is as fastidiously avoided as it was once
promiscuously indulged. 'One does not talk about authors
these days without bowing to the irony of the times', to quote
Marjorie Levinson 1o. And this, in spite of the fact that the
term 'persona' necessarily invokes the poet or the person
whom we cannot but conceive to be behind 'the "poet"
whom we conceive to be behind the whole artifact'.
According to Roland Barthes' now classic, if controversial
distinction, the 'Author' has been replaced with a
'scriptor' 11. Yet even if, as Lawrence Lipkin argues (after
Barthes), 'the author is himself a creation - or, I would
prefer to say, a "project" - of the writer' 12; and even if the
writer were a creation of John Keats and John Keats was
'perhaps not speaking from myself; but from some character
in whose soul I now live'13 (to quote Keats himself, or not
himself, as the case may be) - still, the question of a
responsible subject is only, if indefinitely, postponed.
'The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he
exists before it, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of
antecedence to his work as a father to his child. In complete
contrast, the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with his text,
is in no way equipped with a being preceeding or exceeding the
writing, is not the subject with the book as predicate; there is no
other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally
written here and now'; in his 'The Death of the Author', in lmage-
Music-Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath (London, 1977), pp. 142-
8 (p. 145).
12 In his 'Life, Death, and Other Theories', in Jerome McGann (ed.),
Historical Studies and Literary Criticism (Madison, Wisconsin,
1985), pp. 180-198 (p. 187).
13 In a letter to Richard Woodhouse, 27 October 1818; Letters of John
Keats, sel. and ed. Robert Gittings (London, 1970), p. 158.
10 Keats's Life of Allegory, p. 33.
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II
I draw attention to all this, not to indict the critical
distinctions so clearly articulated by Simpson of any
theoretical, anti-humanist pedantry, any more than I draw
attention below to the confusion in Miriam Allott's
annotations to the Longman edition to indict 'traditional'
humanist criticism of intellectual laziness. My point is, rather,
that the languages and assumptions of a variety of recent
criticisms both betray and highlight precisely the problems
of critical reading and creative apperception with which the
Ode on a Grecian Urn is itself concerned.
The proprietorial claims of the absent author are a case in
point. Authority, responsibility, and accountability for the
work of art are implicit in the opening metaphors alluding to
the ancient, absent craftsman who 'fathered' the urn that has
since become 'a foster-child of silence and slow time' (1. 2).
The significance of this putative genealogy only gradually
becomes apparent, first as the poet asks of the urn questions
that, presumably, only its original creator would have been
qualified to answer -
What leaf-fring'd legend haunts about thy shape
Of deities or mortals, or of both,
In Tempe or the vales of Arcady?
What men or gods are these? What maidens loth?
What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape?
What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy?
(11. 5-10)
- and, following that, as the speaker of the poem begins to
arrogate an interpretative authority and to use the urn as a
focus for his own anxieties. Only belatedly, that is, does the
word 'foster' invoke an interest in origins and original
intentions, and thus in the 'real' or 'natural' parent of the
urn - the potter/sculptor - from whom 'silence and slow
time' have taken over and whose life, it is suggested, is the
'sacrifice' or price paid for the urn's fragile immortality.
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Questions of authority and of the provenance and status of
the urn or work of art do not begin with the second line,
however. The opening apostrophe to a 'still-unravish'd bride
of quietness' has already established the urn's contingent or
relational existence; indeed, its essential openness or
vulnerability to appropriation - an archetypal image of the
feminine that would not have worried Keats in the least,
especially as it undergoes such ironic qualification 14. 'Given
away' by its/her father, who thus resigns his proprietorial
rights, the urn as bride lies fallow ('still unravished') before
the husbandry that will bring its/her meaning and value to
fruition. But beyond this conventional exchange lies the
paradox peculiar to the work of art: 'alive' only in marriage,
it remains 'still [= unmoving], unravished', 'still [= as yet]
unravished', and 'still [= always] unravished' or
impenetrable - like the unbreeding 'maidens' on its brede.
When the speaker in the Ode discovers to his frustration that
the world of the urn will not yield to his various needs and
cannot be married with his own world, what he experiences,
in effect, are the full implications of his own metaphors.
Implicit in the images of the virgin bride and the 'foster
child' is the idea that, while each successive generation is
responsible for the work of art once it has been fathered by
an artist and a culture, none can own it - any more than that
father or artist could own it, being obliged to relinquish it to
society (through marriage) and to history (through his own
death). And Keats, as father to the poem, is implicitly
compared with the dead craftsman, as is the poem with the
urn. 'Words as voiced may at least appear to be backed up
by the presence of their speaker', to quote a recent linguistic
theorist; 'words as written are quite clearly cut off and
14 In an otherwise sustained reading of 'the specific way the Urn defines
and structures feminity', Daniel P. Watkins does not mention the
'bride' as subject and symbol of a patriarchal exchange; see his
Keats's Poetry and the Politics of the Imagination (London and
Toronto, 1989), chapter 5 (p. 108).
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orphaned from any such authority'IS. Fostered out to
silence and slow time, and like those 'Things semireal such as
Love, the Clouds &c which require a greeting of the Spirit to
make them wholly exist' 16, the meaning and value of the
urn/poem are contingent on the collaborative response of
successive 'readers'. Thus Keats's implicit theory anticipates
that of historicist critics like Jerome McGann:
Once the poem passes entirely beyond the purposive control of
the author, it leaves the pole of its origin and establishes the
first phase of its later dialectical life (what we call its critical
history).... - the moving pole of its receptive life...
From any contemporary point of view, then, each poem we
read has - when read as a work which comes to us from the
past - two interlocking histories, one that derives from the
author's ... purposes, and the other that derives from the critical
reactions of the poem's various readers. When we say that
every poem is a social event, we mean to call attention to the
dialectical relation which plays itself out historically among
these various human beings I 7.
What this does not mean, for Keats at least, is that these
successive beholders or readers can suit themselves. On the
contrary, interpretation may involve acts of misreading of the
kind exemplified by the poem's speaker in his wilful
negotiations with the configurations on the urn. The urn
passively 'resists' its own construction as an otherworldly
paradise, for example; its own arrogation or appropriation to
the meditative and affective intensities of the beholder and its
own enlistment in his meaningless debate on the relative
merits of art and lifel8 . And though less obviously, so too
Richard Harland, Beyond Superstructuralism: The Syntagmatic Side
of Language (London and New York, 1993), p. 8 (my italics).
16 Keats to Benjamin Bailey, 13 March 1818; see Letters of John
Keats, ed. Gittings, p. 73.
17 'Keats and the Historical Method in Literary Criticism', MLN, XCIV
(1979), p. 993.
18 To quote Ronald A. Sharp: 'the real focus ...is on the function of art in
life rather than on any tension between the two'; see his Keats,
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does its very indifference - its silence and coldness - resist
his 'academic' attempts to explain it away as an archeological,
aesthetic, and metaphysical curiosity in the final stanza:
o Attic shape! Fair attitude! With brede
Of marble men and maidens overwrought,
With forest branches and the trodden weed -
Thou, silent form, dost teaze us out of thought
As doth eternity. Cold Pastoral!
(11. 41-5)
In spite of the invitation that it offers 'to the spirit' (1. 14) or
the Imagination - and on the issue of sensual versus
spiritual music the speaker's logic and motives are, as always,
dubious; in spite of its nullity in the absence of a beholder,
still it maintains an integrity and remains in part responsible
for its own being-as-meaning or artistic expression.
Having been 'given away' to society and time, then, the
'flowery tale' (1. 4) that is the urn's being-as-meaning
cannot be identified exclusively with any original intention.
As the intentional 'express'-ion (1. 3) of a (now dead)
potter/sculptor, however - a tactile and emotional pushing-
out, seeking two corresponding forms of 'relief' - it will
either resist or accommodate the intentions of anyone of its
beholders. If it is infinitely interpretable, in other words, it is
also radically misinterpretable, interpretability necessarily
implying the possibility of more and less accurate, more and
less faithful interpretations. The speaker of the poem
variously misinterprets, fails to interpret, and over-interprets
the urn-as-art or urn-as-meaning.
III
Rounding back to the obvious analogy with certain types
of recent theory, it is curious that the reaction against what is
understood to be the traditional, paternalistic concept of 'the
Author' - 'in the same relation of antecedence to his work
Skepticism, and the Religion of Beauty (Athens, Georgia, 1979), p.
151.
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as a father is to his child', according to Barthes19 - assumes
(while it condemns) the father's full rights of possession and
of control over the very identity of his child, a nonsense that
is as revealing of the cultural origins of much modem theory
as it is of its identification with the reaction against senescent
authority that can be found in a reductive, archetypal pattern
of romantic comedy.
More importantly, however, 'bowing to the irony of the
times' by eliminating authorship often forces critical
language into anthropomorphic absurdities, with poems and
personae engaged in the willing, controlling, and judging that
can no longer be attributed to dis-integrated linguistic or
institutional constructions like authors yet cannot be
surrendered indifferently to the arbitrary interests of any or
every reader. Otherwise inert, aesthetic objects become agents
that not only design themselves, but exercise their own
imaginations. In truth, however, like 'the dead' (to quote
Conrad), poems and personae 'can live only with the exact
intensity and quality of the life imparted to them by the
living'20.
My point here is that, again, Keats has anticipated the
displacements and obliquities constrained by recent theory.
Analogous to the anthropomorphic gestures of recent
criticism are those of the speaker or poet improper of Keats's
Ode when he attributes to what are lifeless physical objects
and artistic fictions utterly inappropriate powers of active
self-determination, as well as pleasure and pain ('yet do not
grieve' he enjoins the figures in line 18). And while we are
on this point, the ancient Attic ritual of Bouphonia (recorded
here by the historian Pausanias) has implications that in the
light of the fourth stanza become irresistible:
They place barley mixed with wheat upon the altar of Jupiter
Polieus.... The ox who is prepared for the sacrifice touches
19 See above, n. 11.
20 Under Western Eyes (Harmondsworth, 1957), p. 253 (Part fourth,
chapter 1).
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these fruits when he reaches the altar; and the priest whom they
call Bouphonus, or the ox-slayer, hurling his ax at the ox (for
this is the sacred custom), flies afterwards hastily away. But
those that stand near, as if they did not see the striking of the
ox, lead the ax to judgement,21
Of poems as of murders: who done it?
There are, moreover, other similarities between the
speaker's and our own respective critical activities that should
not be lost to the sense we develop of our superior awareness.
Our persistent attempts critically to resolve the enigma of the
Ode and, within and as the key to that, of the last two lines,
for example, might be transcribed as a series of urgent
questions addressed to a 'still unravish'd', 'still, unravish'd'
poem22 - a series of questions resembling the speaker's
unanswerable battery in the first stanza:
What leaf-sing'd legend haunts about thy rhyme
Of scribes ingraved or living, or of both,
In Tempest or the cave of Quietude?
What pots or poets are these? What meaning loth?
What mad pursuit? What struggle to keep time?
What's Truthful in a frozen pulchritude?
Our complacent sense of the appropriateness of our own
critical enquiry into the poem, our own 'reaching after fact
& reason' 2 3 , is surely implicated in the patent
inappropriateness of what Geoffrey Hartman has called the
'crescendoing questions' that the speaker as 'explainer-
ravisher' addresses to the urn, 'until its mystery is in danger
of being dissolved, its form broken for the sake of a
The Description of Greece by Pausanias, [trans. Taylor], in 3 vols
(London, 1794), I, 68 (Book I, chapter 24).
22 The two quotations from the first line here represent the punctuation
in transcripts of the Ode and in the earlier version published in the
Annals of the Fine Arts XV (January 1820) respectively.
23 Stigmatized by Keats, when preferring 'Negative Capability', as an
'irritable' compulsion; see the letter to George and Tom Keats, 21,
[717] December 1817, Letters of John Keats, ed. Gittings, p. 43.
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message'?24 Neither the speaker nor the personified Ode is,
after all, any more conscious, any more responsive than the
figures on the urn to obstinate questioning.
Not that the simple restitution of 'John Keats' as an
intending, determining subject is the answer. It might avoid a
few such glaring solecisms as poems that think and choose
their own rhyme scheme but it will not solve the problems of
the meaning, status, and function of art raised by the Ode.
Whether or not Keats would have been qualified in theory to
answer the questions we ask of the Ode is not for the moment
the issue; the fact is that he is not available. Keats is dead and
to his own 'high requiem become a sod'. To resurrect him in
order to authorize a critical reading is merely to substitute the
critical fiction of a live Keats for the critical fiction of a live
poem or a live Keatsian persona.
I will return to this, however. What at this stage needs to be
stressed is that the simulated anagnorisis or 'discovery' by
the speaker of the inappropriateness of his own responses is
not only the major strategy in the systematic dis-illusionment
enacted by the poem, but is also the major strategy in a dis-
illusionment essayed on the poem's reader. The same
speaker who improperly succumbs to the illusion of the
physical presence of the figures on the urn, momentarily
'feeling' them to be responsive to sympathy and exhortation,
is himself an overwrought 'figure' of our own readerlY
imaginations. If not, like tI:te 'marble men and maidens' that
figure on the urn, directly addressed, the speaker that figures
in the poem is frequently discussed as alive and capable of
active discrimination - a (mis)reading of the Ode on a
Grecian Urn that mirrors his (mis)reading of the Grecian
urn. More than any of Keats's other Odes, the Grecian Urn is
a critical study in Rezeptionsiisthetik, for which reason it is
interesting to observe how adequate a description of the
speaker's 'oscillations' is offered by Wolfgang Iser's
generic account of 'the reading process':
24 The Fate of Reading and Other Essays (Chicago and London, 1975),
p. 102.
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As the formation of illusions is constantly accompanied by
'alien associations' which cannot be made consistent with the
illusions, the reader constantly has to lift the restrictions he
places on the 'meaning' of the text. Since it is he who builds
the illusions, he oscillates between involvement in and
observation of those illusions.25
The Ode offers lessons in how (not) to read Grecian urns that
become lessons in how (not) to read odes - on Grecian urns,
amongst other things.
N
Indeed, it is with readers' negotiations with art that the Ode
is primarily, if not always directly, concerned. Assuming a
more comprehensive perspective than the one offered by the
speaker 'involves the reading mind in a confrontation with
and refinement of its own intentions and ambitions', to quote
David Simpson again26 . More than this, however - or,
rather, in order to achieve this - the reading mind has to
recognize its implication in the narrower perspective and
confront its own limitations and potential for error.
Our resistance to this implication of our own critical
activity with that of the speaker's is encouraged by -
amongst other things - the differences, variously stressed by
the speaker, between the respective media of the poetic and
plastic arts. The success of the Ode as an essay in the
reception and function of art therefore in part depends upon
our recognizing, beyond the apparent dissimilarities, the
significant similarities that obtain between the 'silent' mode
of sculpture on the one hand and, on the other, the 'vocal'
mode of poetry that strains to give the urn a voice. Just as the
reader's must be seen to mirror the speaker's critical activity,
so the poem, speculating on the Grecian urn, must be seen to
speculate or mirror it - a reflexive relationship suggested by
25 'The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach', reprinted in
David Lodge (ed.), Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader (London
and New York, 1988), pp. 211-28 (p. 221).
26 Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry, p. 8.
67
SYDNEY STUDIES
such puns as 'express' (1. 3) and 'legend' (1. 5)27, 'attitude'
(1. 41) and 'overwrought' (1. 42), in the first and last stanzas.
The peculiar fixity of the urn in space is a case in point,
and one accentuated by the apparent contrast with the
poem's 'fluidity' or unfolding in and through time. On
'reflection', that fixity can be seen instead as a trait that, far
from distinguishing, actually identifies the two art objects.
Though constituted by a temporal grammar, poems and their
garrulous personae exist within a space and/or set of spatial
relations as fixed as that of the urn; the vitality or 'presence'
of a lyric voice that immediately (unmediatedly) and
spontaneously registers changes in perception and
consciousness is in fact only an illusion. 'We witness the
text's rhetoric tending to violate the urn's silent alterity',
writes Martin Aske28 . Which is true - but only until we
realize that the text's rhetoric, as written or printed word, is
no more 'noisy' or forthcoming than a Grecian urn: no
more or less obdurate; no more or less a 'silent form' (1. 44).
Nor is there any more movement through time for the
character in a printed poem than there is movement through
space or in(to) time for the figures on the urn. We
collaborate to create the movement by reading it that way -
under authorial persuasion rather than authorial prescription.
Moreover, the temporal succession of word, phrase, sentence,
and stanza of even a single reading of a poem should not be
confused with our apprehension of its meaning(s) which,
even without the poem's elaborate visual (concrete),
phonological, and imagistic patterns, is as much structural as
sequential.
Conversely, any pictorial object, especially one with an
urn's 3600 surface, can only be apprehended through time
- turning the urn or page remains a prerogative of the
27 For an extended discussion of the significance of the word 'legend',
see David Pollard, The Poetry of Keats: Language and Experience
(Sussex and New Jersey, 1984), p. 77.
28 Keats and Hellenism: An Essay (Cambridge, 1985), p. 115.
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'reader' - and thus will be at least partly narrativized, a
tendency in fact represented by the speaker's dramatized
consciousness in the Ode itself, which 'discovers that there is
a rhythm of engagement and disengagement by which the
mind imposes its own temporality on the stasis of visual
art' 29. Both are static and inert artifacts temporalized and
animated by imaginative apprehension.
In the discovery of the urn's illusion that we witness, in
other words, we witness simultaneously the poem's illusion of
that discovery. The more significant, genuine discovery of
the poem is rather this shared identity; the discovery - to
put it another way - that the speaker's questionable
exaltation of plastic over poetic art in the first two stanzas and
his concomitant desire 'to write a Grecian urn' is based, not
on 'false modesty', but on a false distinction30. Though both
are conventionally celebrated as 'immortal' and
'immortalizing', both are in fact lifeless and inert: 'even as
all objects as objects are essentially fixed and dead'31.
v
So much depends upon the nature of the critical attention
given to the viva voce of the lyric which, being so close to the
ubiquitous and irrepressible mediation of human
consciousness, is the most seductive of all artistic illusions.
We have no trouble acknowledging that the figures on the
urn 'live' only the life imparted to them - or imposed upon
29 Helen Vendler, The Odes of John Keats (Cambridge, Mass., and
London, 1983), p. 126.
30 ' ... the museumgoer of this ode is guilty of an initial false modesty
in pretending that the urn is wiser than he is' - Fry, The Poet's
Calling in the English Ode, which ends as do most accounts, by
celebrating the superiority of poetry (p. 251). (For the desire 'to
write' an urn, see John Jones, John Keats's Dream of Truth (London,
1969), p. 220.)
31 To quote from Coleridge's definitions of creativity in the thirteenth
chapter of the Biographia Literaria, ed. EngeIl and Bate, I, 304.
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them, rather - by the speaker; their lifeless indifference is
openly confirmed by his renunciation and almost petulant
withdrawal. And yet the authenticity of the speaker's own
voice, or of the speaker as voice, though it is no less a fiction
than the figures he would animate, has been more or less
naively taken for granted in critical commentary, even often
loosely identified as 'Keats' (a misrepresentation that the
recent criticism I discussed earlier has been only too
determined to avoid). The speaker, that is, is 'brought to life'
without due recognition of those distinctions between life and
art whose reluctant, painful recognition is represented in the
Ode itself.
The following annotations in Miriam Allott's Longman
edition, for example, betray precisely the confusion of fact
and fiction from which the speaker is seen to recover:
15-20. As K. realizes that the figures are frozen into
immobility the ambival[e]nce of his feelings begins to make
itself felt. ...
21-30. The repetitions ... suggest the urgency with which
K. attempts to subdue the ambivalent feelings first apparent in
11. 15-20 above....
29. high-sorrowful] One of the best known of K.' s many
compounds formed with the word 'high' ,32
(Will the real Keats please raise the warm scribe, his hand?)
Of a poem that has proved impossible to discuss without
reference to its pervasive ironies, this blithe attribution to the
speaker of a passion and an activity denied to the figures on
the urn is the overriding and frequently overridden irony, an
irony surely eloquent about the anxieties and aspirations that
inform the confusion of life and art about which the poem
itself has so much to say,
Keats wrote to his brother and sister-in-law in the weeks
leading up to the composition of the Ode that 'they are very
shallow people who take every thing literal' (in the strict
32 The Poems of John Keats (London, 1970), pp. 535-6.
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sense of according to the 'letter' or word). The comment
actually comes immediately prior to the far better known
meditation on a 'Man's life of any worth' as 'a continual
allegory':
very few eyes can see the Mystery of his life - a life like the
scriptures, figurative - which such people can no more make
out than they can the hebrew Bible. Lord Byron cuts a figure
- but he is not figurative - Shakespeare led a life of
Allegory; his works are the comments on it.
The context out of which this meditation grew was a
discussion of the ironic or hypocritical gap between
profession and practice in Benjamin Bailey's behaviour
towards women, and of the tendency of the infatuated
Reynoldses - 'Mother and Daughters' - to take him at his
word. (For the 'pagan' or agnostic Keats, it was no doubt
significant that Bailey 'used to woo [Marian Reynolds] with
the Bible and Jeremy Taylor under his arm' .)33 The context
of the meditation, in other words, is gossip concerned with
the use of speech as evidence of a person's intentions and/or
motives - gossip concerned with personality and personae,
that is - and it includes reflections on the way in which
personal motives inspire misinterpretation. The literary
comparison into which the gossip modulates is in fact
another expression of Keats's preference for 'Negative
capability' over the 'egotistical' mode. Byron's inferiority
to Shakespeare is accounted for in his being a poseur and
marketing an 'attitude' - to 'cut a figure', because of its
origins in fashionable dress, also has strong class associations
('a cut above') - rather than rendering experience through
a number of refractive, exploratory figures or attitudes.
The speaker 'misreads' the urn by taking the figures or
the figurative too literally; correspondingly, that reader
misreads the Ode who takes the figure of the speaker too
literally - especially that reader who takes him as 'Keats',
Keats's life 'being a continued Allegory, or darke conceit'
33 See the letter to George and Georgiana Keats, 14 February - 3 May
1819, Letters of John Keats, ed. Gittings, pp. 217-8.
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and 'thus clowdily enwrapped in Allegorical deuises' and
Keats's poetry but an oblique comment upon it.34 By
exposing the illusive sense of live(1i)ness in both the urn and,
by implication, the poem, Keats further exposes the illusion
of life - of the speaking, exhorting, seeking voice - so
characteristic of the Romantic lyric and so potentially
seductive of the self-cheating Fancy of the reader.
Moreover, just as the Ode, on the contrary, adverts to its
own status as a simulacrum, so does it advert via the urn to its
own status as a cultural product. This is especially true of the
fourth stanza which stresses, besides origins and ends
(conflated in the 'green altar') and the re-presentational
limits of art, the 'mysterious' otherness of a culture which
aestheticizes brutality. Again, to quote Martin Aske: 'The
whole poem moves towards a recognition of the irreversible
alterity of Greece, the inhumanity and (in)difference of the
past' 35. Which, again, is true - but, again, only so far as to
function paradigmatically. Keats wrote out of a sense of his
own and his poem's comparably'irreversible [cultural]
alterity' for a future reader; a sense of his own poem as no
less a product of contemporary cultural and intellectual
exigencies than the urn is a product of antiquity - or The
Faerie Queene and Paradise Lost products of their respective
periods, for that matter. 'What is then to be inferr'd?':
o many things-It proves there is really a grand march of the
intellect-,It proves that a mighty providence subdues the
mightiest Minds to the service of the time being, whether it be
in human Knowledge or Religion.36
34 Like Keats's own meditation, this quotation derives from Spenser's
letter to Raleigh 'expounding his whole intention in the course of
this worke' The Faerie Queene; see the edition by A. C. Hamilton for
Longman (London and New York, 1977), p. 737.
35 Keats and Hellenism, p. 119.
36 Keats to 1. H. Reynolds, 3 May 1818; Letters of John Keats, ed.
Gittings. p. 96.
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VI
John Keats wrote (past tense) a poem entitled Ode on a
Grecian Urn which draws attention (present tense) to his own
absence; to the fact that, though he is 'behind the whole
artifact', historically the artifact has been left behind him and
he has been left behind or superseded by the artifact. The
paradox of the permanent impermanence of art that is
signalled by the speaker's naive, self-interested 'misreading'
of the predicament of the figures on the urn resurfaces,
though far less obtrusively, in line 46:
When old age shall this generation waste ...
The drama of the emotional oscillation of the speaker
between identification and disengagement represents an
awkward, literal imagination caught between two extremes:
seeing the figures on the urn wholly from within, as it were,
and seeing them wholly from without. In line 46 we read the
reader of the urn - whose identity here is less important
than the fact of his being contemporary with the original
production of the Ode - from two similar perspectives.
Reading from 'within' the poem, we identify with a voice in
the present anticipating its own death in the future. Reading
from without, on the other hand, we read from that future:
'this generation' has become that generation, and what is
now 'this generation' (our own) can expect, after its own
'old age' and 'waste', to become that generation to a future
generation calling itself 'this generation' - and so on, as
'generation' struggles unsuccessfully to contain its opposite
or degeneration.
I do not mean to imply in all this that the Ode challenges
us to choose between the extremes of delusion and cold
detachment - of silliness and chilliness, as it were -
alternately occupied by the speaker. His is a negative
example; what is intimated is the combination of
participation and attention of a middle state, in which a
controlled surrender to artistic illusion or 'willing suspension
of disbelief' can be maintained without confusion. I doubt
that 'we cannot, strictly speaking, watch ourselves having an
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illusion', as E. H. Gombrich has argued37 ; surely we can and
do preserve an instinctive sense or inobtrusive consciousness
of our participation in artistic illusion, and without any of
that tension that obliged the speaker in the Ode on a Grecian
Urn to choose between delusion and 'disbelief'.
As both illusion and dis-illusioning product or artifact, the
poem can be a 'friend to man', enlightening and consoling.
Betrothed as it is to an alien 'quietness' and not to man, what
it can never be is the 'bride' to cleave to that, as an apparition
of vitality, it purports to be. That while physically intact it
could remain a 'friend to man' at all is another paradox of
the poem: the paradox of a cold friendship that, while
enlightening and consoling, cannot obliterate the anxiety and
isolation of independent agency and intellectual, affective
individuality (the Self, if not the 'sole Self' of the Ode to a
Nightingale). But this truth or 'reality principle' is part of
the specific consolation offered by the poem. Of the 'beautiful
truths' communicated by the work of art to each passing
generation, in other words, one of the more significant is that
it is itself only a work of art, and therefore a beautiful lie:
we know how to tell many lies that resemble the truth,
but we know also how to tell the truth when we wish
(Hesiod, Theogony, 26-7)38
Just as 'all Cretans', so all works of art are liars, and the Ode
on a Grecian Urn, for all the angst of its verbal activity and
for all its argumentative 'immediacy', is no exception. Out
of the 'lie' of the single-tense, eternal present of art may
come intimations of the 'truth' of time and mortality for
each (de)generation; out of the 'lie' of its serene immobility,
messages of 'going hence' and of 'coming hither'. And out
of both (presumably) may come, along with an
37 Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial
Representation, fifth edn (Oxford, 1977), p. 5.
38 Trans. D. A. Russell, in his and M. Winterbottom's Ancient Literary
Criticism: The Principal Texts in New Translations (Oxford, 1972),
p. 3.
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understanding of that existential journey, much of its
pleasure.
In recent years, Romanticists have rediscovered Keats's
discovery of the Romantic lyric as a frozen product, rather
than a living process; as an artifact, rather than as an
unmediated transcription of the poet's consciousness
spontaneously evolving in and through time39 . Romantic
'sincerity' and 'authenticity' are now identified as rhetorical
tropes, not to say subterfuges. In his influential Romantic
Ideology, for example, Jerome McGann wrote of the 'play or
development of ideas' in the Romantic poem and 'the
movement of consciousness in its search for what it does not
know that it knows' as a mock-search for what it pretends not
to know that it knows, designed to perpetrate the illusion of
the 'true voice of feeling'40 for reasons that are
ideologically suspect41 . So wrote Keats, in his influential Ode
on a Grecian Urn.
VII
Other recent critics, in their turn, have 'rediscovered' in
Keats's poetry a self-sufficient artifice or 'stationing' quite
uncharacteristic of the lyrics of his contemporaries:
Keats's poems tend rather to distinguish than to identify
narrator (or lyric "I") and writer. Rarely do we hear his voice as
the utterance of an unmediated human voice... one must
remember that an anonymous working brain is continuously
engendering and overhearing
writes Marjorie Levinson. Again: 'The framing devices of
Keats's poetry do not, like Wordsworth's preemptive
39 Helen Vendler stunningly understates the case thus: 'It is perhaps
misguided ... to think of Keats as a helpless spirit to whom poems
happened'; The Odes of John Keats, p. 138.
40 Keats to J. H. Reynolds, 21 September 1819; Letters of John Keats,
ed. Gittings, p. 292.
41 The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago and
London, 1983), p. 63.
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techniques, usher us into the poem, they frame us out'42 . All
expression is variously metaphorical, of course, but how far
'into' any poem or work of art can we be ushered? When
the speaker in the Ode sought entry 'into' the paradise he
had projected on to the urn he found only
unaccommodating, cold clay. And it is surely no coincidence
that Levinson should have chosen the Ode on a Grecian Urn
to exemplify Keats's want of Romantic 'hospitality' towards
the reader. Of all the Odes it is the most carefully 'shaped'
or 'patterned' - by more regular stanzas, for example, and
carefully framed vignettes43 ; by the repetition of words and
syntax; by chiastic figures both of speech ('Attic shape, fair
attitude' and 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty' are the obvious
examples) and of thought. The very anagnorisis and
peripeteia I am suggesting, for example, in which the poem
and its reader become implicated in the drama of the urn and
its beholder, involves a conceptual chiasmus in which the urn
and poem become, respectively, a mirror image of each
other: identical in reverse. The poem might have come 'as
naturally as the Leaves to a tree'44, but what in fact came
more closely resembled the 'leaf-fring'd legend' on a
Grecian urn.
Nor is it a coincidence that Levinson should have focussed
on 'the final, bracketed epigram', arguing that it 'puts the
entire poem and all its apparently human and authorial
anguish in aesthetic space: museum space to be precise'45.
Thus with an irony implicating readers at every level of
fictionality and consciousness, Levinson discovers Keats's
poetry to be, in spite of what she calls its 'subject-related
writing', a 'cold pastoral'; her implied object - to dis-
42 Keats's Life of Allegory, pp. 20-21.
43 For a detailed analysis of the structure and structural repetition of the
poem, see Vendler's extended discussion of the Ode in her The Odes
of John Keats, pp. 116-152.
44 For this (in)famous 'axiom', see the letter to John Taylor, 27
February 1818; Letters of John Keats, ed. Gittings, p. 70.
45 Keats's Life of Allegory, p. 20.
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illusion the reader of Keats's poetry by stressing its resistant
otherness - turns out to be none other than Keats's own.
There are significant differences, however. Beyond the fact
that the characteristic artifice of Keats's poetry stressed by
recent criticism can be found mooted or meditated in the
Ode itself, not only was the recognition of unmediated
utterance as a fond illusion an ethical and therapeutic
imperative for Keats, but it need not involve either the
framing out or expulsion of the reader. While ruling out the
unity (and/or appropriation) symbolized by marriage and the
genetic or blood relationship of family, the metaphor of
friendship allows for partial identification and rich rewards.
VIII
Distinctions of tense throughout the critical discussion of a
poet so mortally self-conscious as Keats are crucial. Keats
does not make a discovery, for example; he made it. Keats is
dead and confined, as the urn and the poem are confined,
within 'museum space' (literally, if one thinks of the Keats
Museum at Hampstead). Levinson's persistence in using the
present tense while arguing for Keats's (non)involvement in
the poem - and this in spite of her recognition of the
distinction obtaining between the 'narrator (or lyric "I")
and writer' - ignores this fact of his quite literal non-
involvement; of his being dead, that is. The only 'working
brain ... continuously engendering and overhearing' is the
live reader's, 'in midst of other woe' than Keats's. In this
one sense at least - though it is an important one - we are
better qualified to read the poem than Keats's
contemporaries, being in a better position to appreciate the
analogy between a dead sculptor and his urn and a dead poet
and his poem. Keats's being dead carries the poem's
convictions from the conditional into reality, as I suggested
earlier, and thus gives extra force to the simulated discovery
in the poem.
To suggest the complexity of the meditation on art and
mortality I want to expand on the expression 'impassioned
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clay' from Keats's sonnet 'On Sitting Down to Read King
Lear Once Again' (1. 6), using it as a kind of metaphysical
conceit for the Ode on a Grecian Urn. For one thing,
'impassioned clay' is exactly what the figures on the urn are
- and are not. Passionless per se, that is, they are
impassioned by the speaker. Nor need we not stop here, for
equally they can be said to express their maker's passion.
Our preoccupation with Keats's using Adam's self-fulfilling
dream-prophecy of the creation of Eve as a symbol for the
creative Imagination should not blind us to the older critical
commonplace of the analogy between poetic and divine
creativity, the Old Testament account of the Creation
involving as it does the in-spiration of Adam, or 'clay'. (The
other myth of 'impassioned clay', and the one most often
recalled in discussions of the Ode, is the Classical myth of
Pygmalion.)
If it was Adam/clay that God brought to life, it was also
Adam who, with the Eve of his prophetic dream, 'brought
death into the world'46. In its origins or originating,
art/Imagination conspires at once with life and death. As
generic 'artist', the sculptor would give life to clay figures as
God had given life to a clay figure. 'The remains' of the
dead sculptor's once warm passion, however, can be found
on (and in?47) the 'cold pastoral' of the urn. Just so the
poem itself metaphorically 'contains', within the simulated
passion of an eternally present speaker, the ashes of the once
warm passion of its now dead poet, John Keats.
The paradox of 'impassioned clay' - of the human and
of human values enshrined in an alien, inhuman object -
does not stop at the work of art, however. The dramatized
46 Paradise Lost, I, 3.
47 In her discussion of the Ode in Dark Interpreter: The Discourse of
Romanticism (Ithaca and London, 1980), Tilottama Rajan has made
as much as any commentator of the urn as funereal, though by
identifying the speaker as Keats - 'at the crucial moment he draws
back from excavating too deeply in the archeology of the idealizing
consciousness' (p. 135) - she is forced to read the poem as
disingenuously side-stepping its own intimations of mortality.
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discovery that art is not life involves not only an achieved
understanding of what art is and is not, can and cannot do,
but also an understanding of what life is and is not. This
brings us to that apperception also dramatized in the poem,
in which the apprehension of and response to (in this case)
art induces a consciousness of the nature of one's own
existence:
the consciousness
Of whom [we] are, habitually infused
Through every image, and through every thought,
And all impressions.
The Prelude (1805), XIII, 108-111
In the Ode that apperception recuperates, in another ironic
reversal, the Biblical myth of human 'being' as 'impassioned
clay'; as clay that takes on breath and emotion only to
relinquish it in death. Is it not this intimation of mortality,
with its inexplicable shifts from nonbeing into being and
back again, that the speaker 'knows' through his experience
of art's lifeless liveliness, of the uncertain certainty of origins
and ends in a 'green altar' (1. 32), and of the invoked 'ghost
town' from which
not a soul to tell
Why thou art desolate can e'er return
(11. 39-40)
like Hamlet's 'undiscovered country from whose bourn / No
traveller returns'?48 Is it not this 'dost teaze us out of
thought / As doth eternity'?
All this is a part of what the urn/poem 'say'st' and thus of
what we, 'on earth', will 'know' (1. 50) - about our use and
abuse of, and attitude to art; about ourselves - if we are
open to the analogy between the speaker's and our own
respective struggles to read Grecian urns. What we 'know on
48 Hamlet, III, i, 79-80; Helen Vendler suggested this allusion in a
lecture given at the University of Illinois in 1979; see Leon
Waldoff, Keats and the Silent Work of the Imagination (Urbana and
Chicago, 1985), p. 141 n. 27.
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earth' in fact neither is nor can be contained by an epigram
that would limit both the expressive and discursive potential
of a work of art and the understanding of its audience. But
what the urn says to us, directly, is by no means the sum total
of what we can learn from it, or of what we can learn from
the Ode on it. Beyond confirming an unexceptionable
preference for an engaged over an escapist art, the vexing
final lines offer 'knowledge of the dissembling and opaque
sort generally associated with oracles'49: a calculated
ambiguity delivering a different message to different
suppliants, according to respective needs. The onus, in short,
was and is upon the reader.
49 George B. Walsh, The Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views
of the Nature and Function of Poetry (Chapel Hill and London,
1984), p. 27.
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